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INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS AND THE
EIGHTH AMENDMENT: SOME THOUGHTS ON
METHOD AFTER GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
JAMES I. PEARCE*
INTRODUCTION
In Graham v. Florida,1 the Supreme Court of the United States
decided that imposition of a life without parole sentence (“LWOP”) on
offenders who committed non-homicide offenses as juveniles2 violates the
Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment.3 The
petitioner briefs in two cases raising this issue—Graham and Sullivan v.
Florida—focused on convincing the Court that the LWOP sentence in
these circumstances contravened the proportionality requirement embedded
in the Eighth Amendment.4 Moreover, the briefs invoked the Court’s recent
decision in Roper v. Simmons,5 which held the death penalty for juvenile
offenders unconstitutional.6 Each brief also contained a fleeting reference
to how international materials have treated the juvenile LWOP sentence—
three paragraphs in Graham,7 and only one in Sullivan.8 An amicus curiae
brief submitted by Amnesty International presented a more fully developed
argument that the Court should look to international materials, and in so

* Duke University School of Law, J.D. and LL.M in international and comparative law expected
2011; Yale University, B.A. 2003. For comments and suggestions, I thank Professor Joseph Blocher,
Sunny Kim, Pia Naib, and Emily Eidenier Pearce. This Note is dedicated to Isabel Amina Pearce.
1. 130 S. Ct. 2011 (2010).
2. The Court also heard argument in Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (argued Nov. 9, 2009),
which posed the same question, but then dismissed the case as improvidently granted. See Sullivan v.
Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2059 (2010).
3. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
4. See infra Part II for a discussion of the proportionality analysis in the Court’s Eighth
Amendment capital punishment jurisprudence.
5. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
6. In fact, Roper held the death penalty unconstitutional as applied to sixteen and seventeen yearolds. The Court had already proscribed the use of capital punishment for offenders aged fifteen and
younger in Thompson v. Oklahoma. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
7. Brief for Petitioner at 64-66 Graham v. Florida, No. 08-7412 (July 16, 2009).
8. Brief for Petitioner at 55-56 Sullivan v. Florida, No. 08-7621 (July 16, 2009).
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doing, should hold the juvenile LWOP sentence unconstitutional under the
Eighth Amendment.9
Recent years have seen considerable scholarly controversy over
whether the Supreme Court of the United States, or indeed any American
court, should use international and foreign law when interpreting the U.S.
Constitution.10 Much of the controversy followed the Court’s decisions in
Atkins v. Virginia,11 Lawrence v. Texas,12 and, most recently, Roper.13 The
justices themselves, perhaps most notably Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia,
have entered the fray by addressing the issue outside the courtroom in
debates and public addresses.14 A couple of bills addressing the issue

9. See Brief for Amnesty International, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, Graham
v. Florida (No. 08-7412), Sullivan v. Florida (No. 08-7612).
10. See, e.g., Roger P. Alford, Misusing International Sources to Interpret the Constitution, 98
AM. J. INT’L L. 57 (2004); Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl, The Supreme Court and
Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile Death Penalty Decision, 47
WM. & MARY L. REV. 743 (2005); Sarah H. Cleveland, Our International Constitution, 31 YALE J.
INT’L L. 1, (2006); Vicki C. Jackson, Constitutional Comparisons: Convergence, Resistance,
Engagement, 119 HARV. L. REV. 109 (2005); Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our
Law, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 43 (2004); Joan L. Larsen, Importing Constitutional Norms from a “Wider
Civilization”: Lawrence and the Rehnquist’s Court’s Use of Foreign and International Law in
Domestic Constitutional Interpretation, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1283 (2004); Youngjae Lee, International
Consensus as Persuasive Authority in the Eighth Amendment, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 63 (2007); Michael
D. Ramsey, International Materials and Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM.
J. INT’L L. 69 (2004); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Use and Abuse of Foreign Law in Constitutional
Interpretation, 32 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 653 (2009); Mark Tushnet, When is Knowing Less Better
than Knowing More? Unpacking the Controversy over Supreme Court References to Non-U.S. Law, 90
MINN. L. REV. 1275 (2006); Jeremy Waldron, Foreign Law and the Modern Ius Gentium, 119 HARV. L.
REV. 129 (2005); Ernest A. Young, Foreign Law and the Denominator Problem, 119 HARV. L. REV.
148 (2005).
11. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
12. 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
13. 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
14. Justices Breyer and Scalia famously debated the merits of using foreign and comparative law
in January 2005 at American University, Washington College of Law. Full Written Transcript of
Scalia-Breyer Debate on Foreign Law, AM. UNI. (Jan. 13, 2005) http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/
news/1352357/posts. [hereinafter Breyer-Scalia Debate]. Other justices have also weighed in. See
Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 n* (2002) (Thomas, J., concurring in denial of certiorari) (“While
Congress, as a legislature, may wish to consider the actions of other nations on any issues it likes, this
Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence should not impose foreign moods, fads, or fashions on
Americans.”) (emphasis in original); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr.
to be Chief Justice of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th CONG. 199-201,
292-93 (2005); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court of the United States Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th CONG. 370-71,
470-72 (2005); Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, U.S. Supreme Court, Keynote Address at the
Ninety-Ninth Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law: A Decent Respect to the
Opinions of Humankind: The Value of a Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Interpretation (Apr.
1, 2005), in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 351 (2005); Julia Salvatore et al., Comment, Sotomayor and
the Future of International Law, 47 TEX. INT’L L.J. 487 (2009) (surveying Justice Sotomayor’s
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briefly appeared in Congress, although neither secured enough votes for
passage.15
Rather than engage in wide-ranging debate about the place of
international materials16 in constitutional interpretation, this Note focuses
on the narrower question of how courts could consider international and
comparative law in the analysis of cruel and unusual punishment under the
Eighth Amendment.17 Could is a purposefully chosen word. In a debate
marked by strong—and conflicting—normative claims as to the propriety
of using international materials in constitutional interpretation,18 the focus
here is on method, not appropriateness. To the extent this Note makes a
normative claim, it is this: if American courts are to consider international
materials when deciding the constitutionality of a given punishment under
the Eighth Amendment, they should do so in a principled manner, or not at
all. Developing such a principled manner—and applying it to the Graham
case—is this Note’s contribution to the ongoing debate about the use of
international materials in American constitutional interpretation.
In the spirit of moving the debate beyond generalities about foreign
law and American constitutional interpretation,19 this Note focuses
narrowly on the Eighth Amendment. The decision to focus on the analysis
of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment is not
arbitrary. Looking in particular at the Court’s death penalty jurisprudence,
Part I justifies reference to international materials as part of the Eighth
Amendment analysis on two grounds. First, both the relevant constitutional
text and the text of the standard most commonly applied to such analysis
permit—and arguably envision—consideration of international materials.
Second, the Court has now developed a body of Eighth Amendment

speeches, decisions and confirmation hearing statements about the use of foreign law in domestic
interpretation).
15. See H.R. RES. 568, 108th CONG. (2004); S. RES. 92, 109th CONG. (2005) (arguing that
reliance on foreign judgment and judicial interpretations is inappropriate).
16. “International materials” is used here and throughout the Note as shorthand for both
international and comparative law. Part IV infra discusses such materials in greater detail.
17. For an exhaustive typology of how international materials are used in constitutional
interpretation, see generally Sitaraman, supra note 10 (dividing different uses of foreign law in
constitutional interpretational into “unproblematic,” “potentially problematic,” and “troublesome”).
18. For a useful overview of the positions in the normative debate, see Sitaraman, supra note 10,
at 658-64 (identifying arguments supporting and opposing the use of international materials in
American constitutional interpretation rooted in the theory of liberal democracy and in concerns about
accuracy).
19. Cf. Lee, supra note 10, at 67 (“We have reached a point in the debate where no further
advance seems likely so long as we continue to speak in general terms about the desirability of citing
foreign laws.”).
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precedent in which international materials have played some, even if not a
clearly identifiable, role.
Part II addresses what is arguably the most difficult problem: how to
incorporate international materials into Eighth Amendment analysis. Again
focusing on the line of death penalty cases, this Part discusses three ways
that consideration of international materials can enter the analysis. First,
such materials can be considered as part of the Court’s inquiry into the
“objective indicia of consensus.”20 Second, the Court can consider the
relevance of international materials as part of “the exercise of [its]
independent judgment” as to the appropriateness of the punishment in the
context.21 Finally, international materials can be used to confirm a domestic
consensus.22 This Part also briefly considers advantages and shortcomings
to these different approaches. Ultimately, this Part concludes that the most
appropriate point in the analysis for consideration of international materials
is the Court’s independent judgment.
Because this conclusion raises the troubling specter of judges cherrypicking their favorite international materials (and avoiding those they do
not like), Part III borrows from recent scholarship to propose two principles
for use of international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis of cruel
and unusual punishment.23 Most basically, this part argues that the Court
should focus on both the law and practice surrounding a given norm in a
foreign jurisdiction and then examine if and how the United States has
responded to such a norm. This argument implicates institutional
competence and ultimately suggests that the Court should either use
international materials well, or not use them at all. By way of example, this
Part analyzes—and finds wanting—the Court’s use of international
materials in Roper.
Part IV then discusses how the approach outlined in Part III should
have been applied to the juvenile LWOP sentences as presented in the
Graham case. This application shows that while foreign jurisdictions have
overwhelmingly rejected the juvenile LWOP sentence, the United States
has regularly lodged its intention to opt-out of international treaties or

20. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564.
21. Id.
22. This is how Justice O’Connor’s dissenting opinion in Roper described the role of international
materials. See id. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“ . . . [T]he existence of an international consensus
of this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American
consensus.”); The majority’s invocation of the confirmatory role of international materials is less clear.
See infra note 103.
23. See Cleveland, supra note 10, at 104-24.
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treaty provisions that proscribe the juvenile LWOP sentence.24
Accordingly, a principled consideration of international materials in these
cases should in fact not sway the Court towards or away from upholding
the constitutionality of the juvenile LWOP sentence. However, such a
consideration, while not affecting the result in Graham, would have lent
clarity to the Court’s treatment of international materials for the analysis of
what constitutes cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment.
Finally, in examining the Court’s recent use of international materials
in Graham, Part V concludes that the Court missed an opportunity to
clarify the proper role of such materials under the Eighth Amendment cruel
and unusual punishment analysis. Indeed, the dissent’s response to the
majority’s use of international materials illustrates the ongoing confusion.25
More specifically, this Part notes that while the Court did briefly attempt to
consider both the law and practice of the juvenile LWOP sentence in
foreign jurisdictions, it almost entirely ignored the United States’ response
to the “global consensus”26 regarding the juvenile LWOP sentence. This
approach not only opens the Court to further criticism regarding the
selective use of international materials, it also fails to provide guidance on
a contentious methodological question.
I. TEXT AND HISTORICAL METHOD: INTERNATIONAL
MATERIALS AND EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Because the “basic concept underlying the Eighth Amendment is
nothing less than the dignity of man,”27 courts need not feel uncomfortable
in looking further afield to understand the parameters of cruel and unusual
punishment as compared to other areas of constitutional law. Justice
Blackmun, shortly before his retirement, argued that “[i]nternational law
can and should inform the interpretation of various clauses of the
Constitution, notably the Due Process Clause and the Eighth Amendment
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.”28 While some scholars
have argued that international and foreign law has informed constitutional

24. This is analogous to, though not the same as, the claim that the United States has been a
persistent objector under customary international law. For a further discussion of customary
international law, see infra Part IV.B.
25. See Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2045-46 (Thomas, J. dissenting).
26. Id. at 2033 (majority opinion).
27. Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958).
28. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations, 104 YALE L.J. 39, 45 (1995).

PEARCE_FMT3.DOC

240

1/7/2011 1:50:10 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 21:235

interpretation since the founding and should continue to do so,29 others,
including notably Justice Scalia, take issue with this approach.30
This Part briefly suggests two reasons why consideration of
international practice is reasonable in Eighth Amendment analysis. In
doing so, it makes no larger claims about the appropriateness of applying
international materials more generally in constitutional interpretation.31
First, the relevant constitutional text does not cabin inquiry to specifically
domestic sources and, given its deep historical resonance, arguably
envisions a more expansive construction. Moreover, not only the language
of the Eighth Amendment itself, but also the language of the standard most
frequently applied to it in constitutional analysis—namely, that it inquires
into the “the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society”32—similarly suggests a broad interpretation. Second, the
Court has, since its decision in Trop v. Dulles, consistently looked to
international materials to interpret the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on
cruel and unusual punishment. Thus, through its consistent inquiry into
international materials in Eighth Amendment cases, the Court has arguably
developed such inquiry into a methodological precedent. At the very least,
it has suggested that such inquiry can be appropriate.
A. Constitutional Texts
The Eighth Amendment’s command is succinct: “Excessive bail shall
not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual
punishments inflicted.”33 The Court has long recognized that the
Amendment’s broad language does not lend itself to easy interpretation,34
and that such language does arguably suggest a broad inquiry.35 Indeed,

29. See generally Cleveland, supra note 10.
30. See, e.g., Breyer-Scalia Debate, supra note 14 (Justice Scalia noting that he “do[es] not use
foreign law in the interpretation of the United States Constitution”).
31. This is not to say that the use of international materials in constitutional analysis may not be
appropriate. Indeed, in certain cases, such materials are not only appropriate, but necessary. See, e.g.,
Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491(2008) (interpreting whether a judgment of the International Court of
Justice is directly enforceable as domestic law). The argument here is that the appropriateness of
applying international materials in a given area of constitutional law is best assessed on a case-by-case
basis, focusing, as Roper suggests, on text, history, tradition, precedent and “due regard for . . . purpose
and function in the constitutional design.” See Roper, 543 U.S. at 560.
32. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
34. See Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 368 (1910) (“What constitutes a cruel and unusual
punishment has not been exactly decided.”); see also Trop, 356 U.S. at 99 (“The exact scope of the
constitutional phrase ‘cruel and unusual’ has not been detailed by this Court.”).
35. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 70 (“The constitutional text . . . is reasonably read as inviting
consideration of international values.”).
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understanding what constitutes “cruel” or “unusual” under the Eight
Amendment “may warrant consideration of what practices have been
outlawed under international treatises and customary law” as well as
“consideration of how common, or uncommon, a particular practice is.”36
The Court in Trop suggested in part that a broad reading of cruel and
unusual punishment can be attributed to its deep historical roots. Noting
that the principle is drawn specifically from the English Declaration of
Rights of 1688 and more generally from the Magna Carta, the Court
underscored the Amendment’s role in ensuring that the State’s power to
punish “be exercised within the limits of civilized standards.”37 Whether
intentionally or not, this formulation evokes the third source of law
recognized under the International Court of Justice’s Statute: “the general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations.”38
Beyond the Eighth Amendment’s text, the Court’s holding in Trop
that the “Amendment must draw its meaning from the evolving standards
of a decency that mark the progress of a maturing society”39 articulated a
standard that has become, arguably, a subsidiary constitutional text.40 As
with the actual constitutional text, this standard speaks expansively, and
can be seen to invite consideration of international law and practice.41 The
fact that the Court in Trop promptly applied this standard by looking at
international materials buttresses the argument that such international
inquiry is appropriate.42
36. Id. at 70-71.
37. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 100. Justice O’Connor noted similar language in Roper when discussing
the role of international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 604-05
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“This inquiry [into international and foreign law] reflects the special
character of the Eighth Amendment, which, as the Court has long held, draws its meaning directly from
the maturing values of civilized society.”) (emphasis added).
38. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38(1)(c), June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1031, 3
Bevans 1179.
39. Trop, 356 U.S. at 101.
40. Certainly not all the justices would agree that the Trop standard deserves to be described as a
subsidiary constitutional text. Justice Scalia has expressed that he detests the “evolving standards”
phrase. See Breyer-Scalia Debate, supra note 14. The description of the phrase as a subsidiary
constitutional text is meant as an indication of how deeply embedded in constitutional interpretation the
phrase has become, not a normative claim as to whether the standard should be used.
41. Cf. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 70. But see Breyer-Scalia Debate, supra note 14 (Justice
Scalia arguing that this should apply to “[t]he standards of decency of American society—not the
standards of decency of the world, not the standards of decency of other countries that don't have our
background, that don't have our culture, that don't have our moral views”).
42. Another reading is of course possible. Unlike in the later death penalty cases in which the
“evolving standards” test has been applied, Trop considered whether denationalization, as imposed by
the federal government, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. See Trop, 356 U.S. at 99. Because
individual states cannot “make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of
citizens of the United States,” U.S. CONST., amend XIV, § 1, the Court, with no relevant state-level
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B. Methodological Precedents: International Materials in Eighth
Amendment Analysis
In addition to providing the standard most frequently used in Eighth
Amendment analysis, Trop v. Dulles also inaugurated the practice of
consulting international materials. Although the decision in Trop holding
denationalization a cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth
Amendment only captured five votes, the more relevant metric for this
Note is the fact that eight of the nine justices felt it appropriate to refer to
international materials.43 Writing for a plurality, Chief Justice Warren
noted that the “civilized nations of the world are in virtual unanimity that
statelessness is not to be imposed as punishment for a crime,” and later
cited a United Nations Survey indicating that only two countries, the
Philippines and Turkey, used denationalization as punishment for
desertion.44 In dissent, Justice Frankfurter argued that “[m]any nations
impose loss of citizenship for indulgence in designated prohibited
activities”—although he conceded that the laws mostly applied only to
naturalized citizens.45
In subsequent Eighth Amendment cases, and particularly in cases
deciding whether the application of the death penalty constituted cruel and
unusual punishment, the Court followed the example set by the Trop
Court’s lead.46 In Coker v. Georgia,47 the Court held the death penalty as a
punishment for the rape of an adult woman unconstitutional and noted,
referring to Trop, that “[i]t is thus not irrelevant here that out of 60 major
nations in the world surveyed in 1965, only 3 retained the death penalty for
rape where death did not ensue.”48 Five years later, the Court held the death
penalty unconstitutional for felony murder simpliciter in Enmund v.
Florida,49 referring to the fact that capital punishment for felony murder
had been abolished or restricted in Commonwealth countries and
continental Europe.50 More recently, in deciding the constitutionality of the
legislative enactments, had perforce to look at international materials. By contrast, when the
punishment in question—the death penalty—is inflicted by the states, the Court appropriately focuses
its inquiry only on the American standards of decency. Whatever the merits of such a reading, the Court
has not in fact limited its inquiry in this way. See infra Part II.B.
43. See Trop 356 U.S. at 102-03; see also id. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
44. Id. at 102-03 (majority opinion).
45. Id. at 126 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
46. In Roper, both the majority and Justice O’Connor in dissent note this line of cases. See Roper,
543 U.S. at 575-76 and id. at 604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
47. 433 U.S. 584 (1977).
48. Id. at 596 n.10 (citation omitted).
49. 458 U.S. 782 (1982).
50. Id. at 796-97 n.22.
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death penalty as applied to mentally retarded defendants, the Court in
Atkins v. Virginia51 noted that “within the world community, the imposition
of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded offenders is
overwhelmingly disapproved.”52
The Court’s reference to international materials in juvenile offender
death penalty cases was, until Roper, somewhat less clear. In Thompson v.
Oklahoma,53 the Court emphasized that its decision that the execution of a
person less than sixteen at the time of the offense violated the Eighth
Amendment was “consistent with the views that have been expressed
by . . . other nations that share our Anglo-American heritage, and by
leading members of the Western European community.”54 It then surveyed
these countries in more detail.55 By contrast, the Court’s decision a year
later in Stanford v. Kentucky56 that permitted the death penalty for
individuals between ages sixteen and eighteen at the time of the offense
noted that while international materials could be used to show “‘whether a
practice uniform among our people is not merely a historical accident,’ . . .
they cannot serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment prerequisite, that
the practice is accepted among our people.”57 The Stanford Court did not
refer to international materials in the rest of the opinion.58 Most recently,
the Court returned to considering international materials in Roper, where it
devoted an entire section of the opinion to such consideration.59
***
Without claiming that the Court—and American courts more
generally—should use international materials in construing the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, this Part has
argued that such use is justifiably based in constitutional text and has in
fact been a part of the Court’s analysis for half a century. Given that
international materials have thus played a role in constitutional
interpretation in this area, the next two Parts examine, from different
perspectives, how they have been and can be used.

51. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
52. Id. at 317 n.21 (citation omitted).
53. 487 U.S. 815 (1988).
54. Id. at 830.
55. Id. at 830-31.
56. 492 U.S. 361 (1989).
57. Id. at 369 n.1 (quoting Thompson, 487 U.S. at 868-69 n.4 (Scalia, J., dissenting)).
58. The dissent did call attention to international materials. See id. at 389-90 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
59. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 575-78 (2005).

PEARCE_FMT3.DOC

244

1/7/2011 1:50:10 PM

DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 21:235

II. METHOD I: INCORPORATION OF INTERNATIONAL
MATERIALS IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
This Part explores how consideration of international materials has
been incorporated, and how it might be incorporated differently, in analysis
of cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment. The focus
here—again on death penalty cases—is on the way the Court has set out the
relevant inquiries and where, within these inquiries, it has considered
international materials. In examining how the Court has incorporated
international materials into its Eighth Amendment analysis and how it
might do so differently, this Part flags advantages and disadvantages to the
different approaches. The inquiry here is above all methodological.
Before delving into how the Court has considered international
materials in death penalty cases, a word about how the Court decides the
constitutionality of punishments under the Eighth Amendment is
appropriate. The basic test is one of proportionality, in which the Court has
been guided by the principles “that the harshness of punishment should not
exceed the gravity of the crime and that one should not be punished more
harshly than one deserves.”60 In undertaking this proportionality review,
the Court engages in a two-part analysis. First, it looks for “objective
indicia of consensus”61 as to the punishment under consideration. Second, it
then exercises its “own independent judgment”62 as to the propriety of the
punishment in light of other factors the Court determines relevant. By
consulting consensus as well as its own judgment, the Court decides
whether a given punishment passes constitutional muster under its
proportionality review.63
A. International Materials and the Objective Indicia of Consensus
In all of the post-Trop cases discussed above, the Court has identified
as part of the Eighth Amendment analysis an inquiry into “objective indicia
of consensus”64 regarding the punishment at issue. The Court, however, has
not been consistent on what is appropriately considered as part of these
objective indicia. As explained below, in some cases the Court has stated
that only domestic indicia—in the form of state-level legislative enactments
and jury decisions—are relevant, but has nonetheless considered

60. Lee, supra note 10, at 72.
61. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
62. Id.
63. The Court reiterated the importance of proportionality in Graham. See Graham v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2011, 2021 (“The concept of proportionality is central to the Eighth Amendment.”).
64. Roper, 543 U.S. at 564.
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international materials as part of the inquiry. In other cases, the Court has
suggested a role for international materials in determining a consensus, but
in one of these cases in particular, it did not in fact appear to consider
international materials in this way. Nonetheless, where international
materials have been part of the analysis, they have overwhelmingly been
considered as part of the Court’s inquiry into the objective indicia of
consensus on application of the death penalty.
In three death penalty cases the Court has indicated that the consensus
inquiry should rely on domestic factors—and then included analysis of
international materials nonetheless. In Coker, the Court identified as the
appropriate sources for consideration “history” and the “the objective
evidence of the country’s present judgment concerning the acceptability of
death as a penalty for rape for an adult woman.”65 Yet after deciding that
the “current judgment . . . obviously weighs very heavily on the side of
rejecting capital punishment” for the rape of an adult woman, the Court
added a footnote to include a brief consideration of international materials
as well.66 Similarly, the Court in Thompson described the consensus inquiry
as including only state legislative enactments and jury determinations,67
and yet devoted a paragraph and a long footnote as part of this inquiry to a
consideration of international materials.68 Finally, writing for the majority
in Atkins, Justice Stevens identified “the country’s legislatures” as the most
appropriate source of consensus,69 and then buttressed the conclusion that
consensus had developed against the death penalty for mentally retarded
offenders by noting that “this legislative judgment reflects a much broader
social and professional consensus,” including “within the world
community.”70
By contrast, two cases suggest that consideration of international
materials is appropriate to determining objective indicia of consensus. The
Court in Enmund said so specifically when it included among the relevant
factors “the historical development of the punishment, legislative
judgments, international opinion, and the sentencing decisions juries have
made.”71 It then proceeded to consider the existence and use of capital

65. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977).
66. Id. at 596 & n.10 (noting that only three out of 60 nations surveyed by the United Nations
retained the death penalty for rape where death did not ensue).
67. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822-23 (1998).
68. Id. at 830-31 & n.34 (discussing the use of the death penalty in “nations that share our AngloAmerican heritage” and other “leading members of the Western European community”).
69. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 204, 312 (2002).
70. Id. at 116-17 n.21.
71. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 788 (1982) (emphasis added).
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punishment for felony murder in England, India, Canada as well as other
Commonwealth countries and continental Europe.72 In Roper, the Court’s
indication that consideration of international materials may be appropriate
as part of determining consensus is, at best, implicit: “The beginning point
is a review of objective indicia of consensus, as expressed in particular by
the enactments of legislatures that have addressed the question.”73 In giving
state legislative enactments the lead role in the analysis, Justice Kennedy
suggested that such consensus may also be expressed elsewhere—including
abroad. As noted below,74 however, the Court in Roper used international
materials to confirm, rather than to determine, its conclusion that the death
penalty as applied to juvenile offenders was unconstitutional.
Including consideration of international materials in the “objective
indicia of consensus” inquiry has a number of advantages. First, and most
basically, it is where the Court has most frequently incorporated its
consideration of such materials in past cases.75 Thus, continuing to
incorporate consideration of international materials at this point in the
analysis is appropriate as a matter of methodological consistency. Second
and related to methodological consistency, consideration of international
materials as part of the consensus inquiry allows litigants to know the role
such consideration will play in Eighth Amendment cases. Third, because
determining objective indicia of consensus under the Eighth Amendment
largely involves what one scholar has called “nose-counting”76—that is,
determining whether a jurisdiction does or does not permit or use a given
punishment—it is relatively easy to incorporate such materials by tallying
up jurisdictions. Finally, including consideration of such materials as part
of the objective indicia of consensus is both transparent and, as the inquiry
suggests, objective.
It is important to underscore shortcomings with incorporating
consideration of international materials as part of the consensus inquiry as
well. First, the Court has not been entirely clear as to whether consideration
of international materials is appropriately part of the consensus inquiry.
Even in those cases where it has considered such materials, the Court’s

72. Id. at 796-97 n.22.
73. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005) (emphasis added).
74. See infra Part II.C.
75. At least the Court has included such consideration in the section of its opinion addressing
consensus. In both Coker and Atkins, however, the Court appeared to have concluded that such
consensus existed and then, in a footnote, indicated that international materials confirmed this
conclusion. Part III.C, infra, discusses this in more detail.
76. See Young, supra note 10, at 153. For a more detailed description of this “aggregation”
problem, see also Sitaraman, supra note 10, at 681-90.
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articulation of the appropriate inquiry suggests that only domestic factors
are relevant.77 Second, looking for objective indicia of consensus outside
the country is arguably undemocratic as it counts noses unaffected by the
Court’s ruling. On a related point, adding foreign jurisdictions skews the
proper inquiry and mostly leads to “denominator swelling”—giving the
impression that greater consensus exists than is actually the case.78
B. International Materials and the Exercise of Independent Judgment
In Eighth Amendment analysis, the second inquiry after looking at
objective indicia of consensus has the Court “determine, in the exercise of
[its] own . . . judgment”79 whether a given punishment is disproportionate
in the circumstances. Although the Court is not fully in agreement as to
whether this inquiry is appropriate,80 the majority of cases, including one of
the Court’s most recent Eighth Amendment decisions,81 confirm its place in
the analysis. Indeed, since the Court determined in Coker that “the
Constitution contemplates that in the end our own judgment will be brought
to bear on the question of the acceptability of the death penalty under the
Eighth Amendment,”82 the Court has, with the exception of Stanford,
consistently seen fit to assess whether “there is reason to disagree with the
judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators.”83
To be sure, the Court has never suggested that consideration of
international materials falls within its independent judgment. Instead, the
Court has used this part of the analysis to examine the specific facts of the
case at hand,84 statistics,85 various social science studies,86 and the social

77. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 204, 312 (2002); Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 82223 (1998); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 593 (1977).
78. See Young, supra note 10, at 158-60.
79. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 564 (2005).
80. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989) (“We have no power under the Eighth
Amendment to substitute our belief in the scientific evidence for the society’s apparent skepticism. In
short, we emphatically reject . . . that the issues in this case permit us to apply our ‘own informed
judgment.’”).
81. See Kennedy v. Louisiana, 128 S.Ct. 2641, 2650 (2008) (“Whether the death penalty is
disproportionate to the crime committed depends as well upon the standards elaborated by controlling
precedents and by the Court’s own understanding and interpretation of the Eighth Amendment’s text,
history, meaning and purpose.”) (emphasis added).
82. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 597 (1977).
83. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 313 (2002). See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 564; Thompson v.
Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782, 797 (1982).
84. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597-99; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 797-98.
85. See Thompson, 487 U.S. at 837; Enmund, 458 U.S. at 798-99.
86. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 568-74; Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-21; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 834-36.
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purposes of capital punishment.87 But if this inquiry is to remain part of the
Eighth Amendment analysis, it may be a more sensible place,
methodologically speaking, for consideration of international materials to
occur. If the Court is to treat such materials as persuasive, and not binding,
it can arguably engage in a more nuanced assessment of how foreign
jurisdictions have considered the punishment than it otherwise would as
part of the “nose-counting”88 under the consensus inquiry. Given the
specific discretionary grant to the Court to inquire whether “there is reason
to disagree with the judgment reached by the citizenry and its legislators,”89
perhaps a thorough-going consideration of international materials may
provide such a reason. As long as the Court—or any court—is transparent
in its use of international materials in this part of the analysis, it is unclear
why such consideration would be less objectionable than reference to social
science studies and statistics or philosophical inquiries into the larger
purposes of the criminal sanction.90
The most troubling aspect of incorporating consideration of
international materials into the Court’s exercise of its independent
judgment reflects the controversy this exercise of judgment has
engendered. Precisely because the Court has not articulated what properly
falls within the scope of this inquiry, litigants are left guessing what the
Court may find relevant when exercising its independent judgment in
resolving a case. As Justice Scalia has emphasized throughout this line of
cases, this inquiry leaves seemingly unbounded discretion to the nine
justices.91 Of course, this critique—which has only carried the Court
once92—applies to the inquiry as a whole, and not more specifically to the
consideration of international materials.

87. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 318-20; Thompson, 487 U.S. at 836-38.
88. See Young, supra note 10, at 153.
89. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
90. Justice Scalia argues in dissent in Roper that the Court considers international materials in
precisely this way and yet fails to be forthcoming about it: “‘Acknowledgement’ of foreign approval
has no place in the legal opinion of this Court unless it is part of the basis for the Court’s judgment—
which is surely what it parades as today.” Roper, 543 U.S. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in
original). The argument in this Note agrees with Justice Scalia insofar as he can be understood to
suggest that if the Court is going to make consideration of international materials a part of its
independent judgment, it should do so transparently.
91. See Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 378 (1989). See also Thompson, 487 U.S. at 873
(Scalia, J., dissenting); Atkins, 536 U.S. at 348-49 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Roper, 543 U.S. at 616
(Scalia, J., dissenting).
92. See Stanford, 492 U.S. at 378.
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C. The Confirmatory Role of International Materials
The Court’s articulation in Roper of the proper role for international
materials differed from any previous explanation. The Court devoted the
entire final section of its opinion to a consideration of international
materials and did so to confirm its “determination that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18.”93 Justice O’Connor
dissented because she disagreed that a national consensus against the death
penalty had formed and disagreed with the imposition of a categorical rule,
but acknowledged the “confirmatory role” that international materials can
play in constitutional analysis.94 Thus, Roper arguably initiated a third
possible way in which international materials can enter the Eighth
Amendment analysis: as a confirmation of the Court’s conclusion on either
the consensus or the independent judgment inquiries—or perhaps as
confirmation of both.95
At the same time, two of the cases that considered international
materials as part of the consensus inquiry essentially relegated such
materials to a confirmatory role, even though the Court did not say this
explicitly. In Coker, the Court had concluded that while states had not
unanimously proscribed the death penalty as a punishment for the rape of
an adult woman, an overwhelming number had “obviously weigh[ed] very
heavily on the side of rejecting capital punishment.”96 It then added a
footnote that in essence confirmed the Court’s conclusion.97 Similarly, the
Court in Atkins concluded that “[t]he practice [of executing offenders with
IQs less than 70] . . . has become truly unusual, and it is fair to say that a
national consensus has developed against it.”98 Only then—and also in a
footnote—did the Court briefly consider how international materials
confirmed its conclusion.99 Thus, although the Roper Court was the first to
articulate the confirmatory role for international materials explicitly, the
Court’s decisions in Coker and Atkins largely adopted this approach in
practice.

93. Roper, 543 U.S. at 575.
94. Id. at 605 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“At least, the existence of an international consensus of
this nature can serve to confirm the reasonableness of a consonant and genuine American consensus.”).
95. As noted, Justice Scalia disagreed with the Court’s characterization of how international
materials were used in Roper. See id. at 628 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also Atkins, 536 U.S. at 313.
96. Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 596 (1977).
97. Id. at 596 n.10 (noting that only three out of sixty countries surveyed by the United Nations
imposed the death penalty where death did not ensue).
98. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316.
99. Id. at 317 n.21 (“[W]ithin the world community, the imposition of the death penalty for crimes
committed by mentally retarded offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved.”) (citation omitted).
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Consideration of international materials as a confirmation of the
Court’s decision has some advantages. First, there is a strong argument that
by explicitly relegating such consideration to a subsidiary role, the Court
properly focuses its inquiries on the treatment of the punishment in the
United States. On a related note, by not introducing consideration of
international materials into either of the other two inquiries, the Court does
not “swell the denominator”100 in the consensus inquiry nor does it have its
independent judgment improperly swayed by “like-minded foreigners.”101
Finally, by only consulting international materials when they confirm a
Court’s decision, there should be no possibility that the Court contravenes
national views on the punishment at issue.
The disadvantages, however, largely outweigh the advantages a
confirmatory approach offers. First, there is a basic question of how much
work such an inquiry actually does. As Professor Ernest A. Young has
asked, “[w]ould a domestic conclusion that is not confirmed by foreign
practice be insufficient to strike down a state law?”102 It seems unlikely that
the Court would find a national consensus against a punishment, see no
reason to uphold the punishment when exercising its independent
judgment, and yet choose not to strike it down because international
materials do not confirm the first two inquiries. Second, what precisely do
international materials confirm under this approach? That is, this approach
leaves open whether the Court should consider international materials to
confirm objective indicia of consensus or its own exercise of independent
judgment—or perhaps both.103 Finally, the Court arguably stacks the
international deck if it is only to look to international materials when such
materials confirm its decision. Justice Scalia has made this point
repeatedly, by noting that in other areas of international and comparative

100. See Young, supra note 10, at 158-60.
101. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
102. Young, supra note 10, at 154 (emphasis in original).
103. Indeed, the Court’s two references to the confirmatory role of international materials in Roper
do not make clear whether such materials confirm the consensus inquiry or the Court’s own
independent judgment. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 575 (“Our determination that the death penalty is
disproportionate punishment for offenders under 18 finds confirmation in the stark reality that the
United States is the only country in the world that continues to give official sanction to the juvenile
death penalty.”) and id. at 578 (“The opinion of the world community, while not controlling our
outcome, does provide respected and significant confirmation for our own conclusions.”). The first
statement suggests that international materials explicitly contradict the U.S. position. The second does
not indicate which conclusions—is it all of them?—international materials confirm.
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law, consideration of international materials would explicitly disconfirm
the Court’s conclusions.104
***
In examining the ways international materials have been and can be
incorporated into Eighth Amendment analysis, this Part has aimed at a
clearer methodological understanding of how the Court can and does
consider such materials. It starts from the assumption—admittedly
controversial—that there is a place for such consideration in the analysis,
and focuses on advantages and disadvantages inherent in the approaches
the Court has taken and seems most likely to take in the future. Indeed, the
methodological difficulties discussed here arguably provide a more
concrete forum to debate the larger normative question on the role of
international materials in American constitutional interpretation.
In examining the three ways in which the Court has considered
international materials, this Part arrives at the tentative conclusion that
incorporating such materials as part of the exercise of its own independent
judgment is the most defensible approach. Incorporating consideration of
international materials in the exercise of the Court’s independent judgment
allows for a nuanced inquiry that simply cannot be done under either the
“objective indicia consensus” analysis or the “confirmatory” approach.
Consideration of international materials in the “objective indicia of
consensus” analysis risks aggregation and “denominator-swelling”
problems whereas using such materials only to confirm a previous
judgment adds little, if anything, to the overall inquiry. The most
troublesome objection to considering international materials as part of the
exercise of independent judgment is the concern with judicial cherrypicking.105 The response to this objection is to develop a principled
approach to how the Court—and courts—should consider international
materials as part of the Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
analysis. The next two Parts take up this task.

104. See, e.g., Roper, 543 U.S. at 624-26 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that international practice
does not confirm U.S. constitutional law in Fourth Amendment, Establishment Clause and abortion
cases).
105. This critique of the selective use of international materials is analogous to that made of the
selective use of legislative history. In both cases, an unprincipled judge can simply “look over the heads
of the crowd and pick out . . . friends.” ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL
COURTS AND THE LAW 36 (1997) (attributing quotation to Judge Harold Leventhal). There is a similar
critique regarding the selective use of dictionaries to define terms. See generally Ellen P. Aprill, The
Law of the Word: Dictionary Shopping in the Supreme Court, 30 ARIZ. ST. L. J. 275 (1998); Rickie
Sonpal, Old Dictionaries and New Textualists, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2177 (2003).
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III. METHOD II: TOWARDS A PRINCIPLED USE OF
INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS IN EIGHTH AMENDMENT
ANALYSIS
The question unaddressed in Part II and taken up here centers on
another methodological inquiry: assuming the Court will incorporate
consideration of international materials into its analysis of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, can it use such
materials in a principled way? This Part borrows two proposals from recent
scholarship to suggest a more principled way for the Court to use
international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis. Finally, it closes by
measuring the Court’s use of international materials in Roper against these
principles.
An initial caveat is important. Using international materials—that is,
engaging in a close and thoughtful study of international and comparative
legal documents—is very difficult to do well.106 Such difficulty should not
necessarily dissuade the Court, but it should counsel caution in the use of
such materials. Indeed, one scholar has argued that both decision costs—
”the time, effort, and expense involved in deciding cases in a particular
way”—and error costs—”the likelihood of making mistakes by pursuing a
particular method”—seem likely to plague American courts trying to make
sense of international materials.107 This need not be the case, and the
principles articulated here do not require courts to engage in the kind of
complicated comparative work that some scholars have called for.108
However, if the Court—and courts more generally—are unable to engage
in a more thorough, principled consideration of international materials,
there is a strong institutional competence argument weighing against such
consideration. This Part briefly begins to sketch out what consideration of
international materials might look like in the context of Eighth Amendment
cases.
A. International Acceptance in Law and Practice
If courts assessing whether a given punishment in the U.S. is cruel and
unusual look at both legislative enactments and—in the case of the death

106. For a sense of the difficulties involved in effectively understanding “global law,” see generally
WILLIAM TWINING, GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE: UNDERSTANDING LAW FROM A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
(2009); WILLIAM TWINING, GLOBALISATION AND LEGAL THEORY (2000).
107. See Young, supra note 10, at 165-66.
108. Cf. Lee, supra note 10, at 114 (“[T]he Court is unlikely to become the kind of thoughtful,
sophisticated comparativist that engages with other legal systems envisioned by some scholars.”). Lee
cites Vicki C. Jackson as an example of one such scholar. Id.
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penalty—the actual practice of juries,109 foreign jurisdictions should be
subject to the same scrutiny. Translated into a methodology for assessing
international materials, the guidance for American courts is
straightforward: courts should look both at how well-defined and accepted
a given norm is in a foreign jurisdiction and the extent to which state
practice in that jurisdiction actually conforms to the expressed legal
commitment.110 Such an approach enriches the Court’s current “[n]osecounting”111 by delving more deeply into whether a given jurisdiction in
fact adheres to the practice that it otherwise espouses.
Nor should the research difficulties associated with determining state
practice necessarily prove insurmountable. In addition to a rich body of
comparative law scholarship,112 a number of organizations, including,
Freedom House, Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, focus
considerable attention on state practice in areas of individual rights. These
organizations have managed to collect data from jurisdictions whose own
statistics do not inspire high degrees of confidence.113 In short, resources
exist that allow courts to understand both law on the books in foreign
jurisdictions and the extent to which such jurisdictions comply with these
laws. If international materials are to be used in Eighth Amendment
analysis, the Court should utilize these resources to look at both law and
practice. It has, up to this point, focused on the former and largely—if not
entirely—ignored the latter.
B. United States’ Response to the International Norm
A second step toward ensuring a principled use of international
materials is for the Court to inquire more closely into whether the United
States has accepted the relative international norm at issue.114 As Sarah
Cleveland has noted, such acceptance could be ascertained by looking to
four different areas: 1) treaty ratifications; 2) acceptance of treaties through

109. See, e.g., Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 822 (1988) (“[I]n confronting the question
whether the youth of the defendant . . . is a sufficient reason for denying the State the power to sentence
him to death, we first review relevant legislative enactments, then refer to jury determinations.”).
110. Cf. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 113.
111. See Young, supra note 10, at 153.
112. See, e.g., TWINING, supra, note 106 and sources cited therein.
113. A snapshot of Human Rights Watch’s website in May 2010 provides a useful exmaple. At that
time, Human Rights Watch had recently conducted studies of the persecution of Kurds in Syria, alleged
witchcraft and sorcery cases in Saudi Arabia, sham trials of human rights activists in China and an
assessment of the National Security Law in Sudan. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, http://www.hrw.org
(last visited May 5, 2010).
114. See Cleveland, supra note 10, at 115-24.
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customary international law;115 3) international customary laws to which
the U.S. has not persistently objected; and 4) jus cogens norms.116 By
contrast, the U.S. should be understood to have rejected an international
norm through a treaty reservation or through persistent objection.117
A somewhat more difficult factor here is the United States’ decision
not to ratify a treaty. While such a decision is a clear signal of the U.S.’s
intention not to consent to the treaty, it does not necessarily always entail a
rejection of the norms embodied in the treaty. For example, while five
senators on the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations acknowledged
pervasive human rights violations against women throughout the world and
expressed an interest in seeing such violations ended, they recommended
against ratification of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
Discrimination Against Women (“CEDAW”) because they did not believe
that CEDAW was “a proper or effective means of pursuing that objective.”
118
Indeed, the Committee as a whole did recommend ratification, but it did
not pass the Senate.119 A court considering such a treaty as part of a
consideration of international materials could, ceteris paribus, count it as a
neutral factor.
While such an inquiry properly respects the role of the political
branches in the interpretative process,120 assessing the U.S.’s acceptance of
a norm in the Eighth Amendment context should not be treated by courts as
dispositive—at least under the “independent judgment” inquiry.121 By
looking to how, or indeed if, the Legislative and Executive branches have
responded to an international norm, courts avoid the critique that they are
doing an end-run around the political process. Indeed, a court should
include the U.S.’s acceptance or rejection of the international norm as part
of its inquiry into objective indicia of consensus,122 especially considering
115. Cleveland gives as examples the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and aspects of the
Law of the Sea Convention. See id. at 115.
116. Id. Jus cogens norms refer to peremptory rules of international law from which no derogation
is permitted. See IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 121 (6th ed. 2003).
117. Cleveland, supra note 10, at 115.
118. See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 103D CONG., EXEC. REP. (1994) S384-10
reprinted in HENRY J. STEINER & PHILIP ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: LAW,
POLITICS, MORALS 207 (2d ed. 2000).
119. STEINER & ALSTON, supra note 118, at 208.
120. See Cleveland, supra note 10, at 116.
121. See supra Part II.B.
122. Asking an American court to consider whether American legislatures, executives and courts
have accepted or rejected an alleged international norm as part of the objective indicia of consensus is
distinct from asking an American court to consider foreign jurisdictions as part of the objective indicia
analysis. Although, as noted supra Part II.A, American courts are ill-equipped to tackle the latter
analysis, they regularly interpret the actions of American institutions.
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that such a statement would clearly address whether such consensus
existed. At the same time, in a situation where foreign jurisdictions as well
as international treaty and customary law have established a norm that the
American political branches have rejected, a court would not be restricted
from considering such materials as part of the independent judgment
inquiry under the Eighth Amendment analysis.123
However a court comes out, it should fully and transparently identify
how the U.S. has responded to an international norm. Further, a court
should explain how the U.S. position—acceptance, rejection or something
in between—factors into its own decision. As noted above, if a court is
unable or unwilling to engage in this type of analysis, consideration of
international materials is arguably best excluded.
C. Principles in Action: A Brief Application to Roper
Applying the two principles articulated here, it is apparent that the
Court’s use of international materials in Roper falls short of the mark. Such
a conclusion does not imply that international materials should not have
been considered; rather, it suggests that the Court should have done a more
effective job of using and explaining its use of such materials.
The Court in Roper included no discussion of whether countries that
have legislatively abolished the death penalty as applied to juvenile
offenders actually adhere to these laws in practice. Justice Scalia rightfully
criticizes the Court on this point; indeed he even provides a citation for his
supposition that a number of the countries that have putatively proscribed
the penalty in fact use it in practice.124 The “weight of the authority”125 on
this point is almost certainly with the Court,126 but it fails to communicate
this effectively when it does not adequately consider state practice in
foreign jurisdictions alongside its consideration of international law “on the
books.”
Additionally, the Court’s treatment of the U.S. response to the two
relevant treaties—the International Convention on Civil and Political
Rights (“ICCPR”) and the Convention on the Rights of the Child

123. See Cleveland, supra note 10, at 118. Cleveland notes in particular that with norms that
construe limits on governmental power—generally understood as “countermajoritarian constraints on
the political branches”—courts owe less judicial deference to those branches. See id. at 117.
124. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 552, 623 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing RITA J. SIMON &
DAGNY A. BLASKOVICH, A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: STATUTES, POLICIES,
FREQUENCIES, AND PUBLIC ATTITUDES THE WORLD OVER (2002)).
125. Id. at 578 (majority opinion).
126. Indeed, this is evident from the very study Justice Scalia cites. See generally SIMON &
BLASKOVICH, supra note 124.
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(“CRC”)—leaves much to be desired. While the Court does acknowledge
that the U.S. made a reservation to the ICCPR’s prohibition on capital
punishment for juveniles in Article 6(5),127 it then claims that the
reservation is largely immaterial on account of both five U.S states having
abolished the death penalty for juveniles and subsequent Congressional
action unrelated to the ICCPR.128 While such events may be relevant for the
domestic consensus inquiry, the Court’s implicit suggestion that such
actions somehow cancelled the reservation is both misleading and, from an
international law perspective, simply incorrect.129 Moreover, the Court’s
emphasis on the fact that other countries have not entered reservations on
the capital punishment provision in the CRC obscures the important point
that the U.S. have entered such a reservation to the relevant provision in the
ICCPR.130 The U.S.’s specific rejection of the prohibition on capital
punishment pursuant to its ICCPR reservation need not determine the
Court’s conclusion in Roper, but the Court must make a better effort at
forthrightly explaining why it does not.
Finally, the Court’s passing reference to the CRC does not adequately
explain why a treaty that the U.S. has not ratified is worthy of the Court’s
attention. If the Court points to the CRC as objective indicia of consensus,
Justice Scalia’s obvious rejoinder that the U.S. has explicitly not joined
such consensus seems fatal.131 But this would not be so if the Court were to
explain that non-ratification does not necessarily imply rejection of the
norm at issue132 and that in any case, the overwhelming number of
countries that have signed onto (and not entered reservations on) the CRC
and its prohibition of capital punishment for juveniles is relevant to the
Court’s exercise of its independent judgment. This may indeed not have
been the Court’s reasoning; the point here is to emphasize the Court’s
failure to flesh out its reasoning on the relevance of the U.S.’s nonratification of the CRC.
IV. INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS APPLIED TO GRAHAM V.
FLORIDA
With the Graham and Sullivan cases, the Court had the opportunity to
elucidate the proper role of international materials in Eighth Amendment
127. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 567.
128. Id.
129. See LORI DAMROSCH ET AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 477 (4th ed.
2001). See also Roper, 543 U.S. at 622-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
130. See Roper, 543 U.S. at 576.
131. Id. at 622 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
132. See supra Part III.B.
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cases. For some justices, of course, this means no role at all.133 But for
those convinced that there is a role for international materials in the Eighth
Amendment analysis, this Part applies the principled use of such materials
developed in Part III to the Graham case.134 This application leads to two
conclusions. First, it is clear the juvenile LWOP sentence is widely
proscribed in law and practice. Second, the political branches of the United
States have repeatedly opted out of the relevant international treaties and
treaty provisions prohibiting the juvenile LWOP sentence. On balance,
then, the use of international materials on the question of whether the
juvenile LWOP sentence should be held unconstitutional stands in
equipoise. While such a minimal contribution to the final result in the
Graham case may seem unsatisfactory, an analysis that lends clarity to how
international materials will be used in Eighth Amendment cruel and
unusual punishment cases would prove of great methodological use over
the longer term.
A. The Law and Practice of the Juvenile LWOP Sentence
Dissenting in Roper to the majority’s use of international materials,
Justice Scalia noted that while the Court’s decision invalidated the death
penalty, it left in the place the similarly prohibited juvenile LWOP
sentence.135 Indeed, if anything, the juvenile LWOP sentence appears even
more widely proscribed than the juvenile death penalty.136 Importantly, this
proscription is captured in both law and practice.
The international community’s rejection of the juvenile LWOP
sentence appears in two widely ratified international treaties and a couple
of recent United Nations General Assembly resolutions. First, the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) specifically refers to, and
condemns, the practice in Article 37(a).137 Moreover, Article 37(b)
provides that any incarceration of juveniles “shall be used only as a
133. This would be particularly true of Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas. See supra note 14.
134. As noted, Sullivan v. Florida was dismissed as improvidently granted. See supra note 2.
135. Roper, 543 U.S. at 623 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is also worth noting that, in addition to
barring the execution of under-18 offenders, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child
prohibits punishing them with life in prison without the possibility of release.”).
136. See generally Connie De La Vega & Michelle Leighton, Sentencing Our Children to Die in
Prison: Global Law and Practice, 42 U.S.F. L. REV. 983 (2008) (surveying the global use of the
juvenile LWOP sentence).
137. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(a), Nov. 30, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. The
Committee on the Rights of the Child, which is tasked with overseeing implementation of the CRC,
added a General Comment in 2007 clarifying the prohibition: “The death penalty and a life sentence
without parole are explicitly prohibited under article 37(a) of CRC.” Comm. on the Rights of the Child,
Children’s Rights in Juvenile Justice, General Comment No. 10, ¶ 11, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/GC/10 (Apr.
25, 2007).
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measure of last resort and for the shortest appropriate period of time.”138
All members of the United Nations except for Somalia and the United
States have ratified the CRC, and only a handful of those that have ratified
the CRC have made a reservation to Article 37.139 Second, provisions of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”)140 have
been read to disallow the juvenile LWOP sentence. In particular,
commentators have emphasized the requirement in Article 14(4) that states
shall take into account a juvenile’s age when applying criminal sanctions141
alongside the language in Article 9(1) that “[n]o one shall be deprived of
his liberty except on such grounds and in accordance with such procedure
as are established by law”142 to reach the result that the ICCPR prohibits
the juvenile LWOP sentence.143 Other commentators have looked to the
Article 7 prohibition on cruel, degrading or inhumane punishment144 as
well as the requirement in Article 10(3) that “[j]uvenile offenders shall be
segregated from adults and be accorded treatment appropriate to their age
and legal status.”145 Finally, the United Nations General Assembly has
twice recently passed overwhelming resolutions which in part condemned
the practice of juvenile LWOP sentences; the resolution carried 185 votes
in 2006 and 183 votes in 2007.146 In both cases, only the United States
opposed the resolutions.147
In addition to the international law consensus against the juvenile
LWOP sentence, the law and practice of foreign jurisdictions indicates the
juvenile LWOP sentence is only in use in the United States.148 A 2005
survey conducted by Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International

138. Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37(b), Nov. 30, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3.
139. See United Nations Treaty Collection, Convention on the Rights of the Child, http://
treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-11&chapter=4&lang=en
(last
visited Nov. 21, 2010). Australia, Canada, Iceland, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand,
Singapore, and Switzerland have entered reservations. In all but two cases, these reservations are to Art.
37(c)’s requirement to avoid mixing children with adult detainees.
140. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. E, 95-2
(1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
141. Id. at art. 14(4).
142. Id. at art. 9(1).
143. See Vincent G. Levy, Note, Enforcing International Norms in the United States After Roper v.
Simmons: The Case of Juvenile Offenders Sentenced to Life Without Parole, 45 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 262, 270-71 (2007).
144. ICCPR, supra note 140, at art. 7.
145. Id. at art. 10(3). For this argument, see De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 1010.
146. Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 62/141, ¶ 36(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/62/141 (Dec. 18, 2007);
Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 61/146, ¶ 31(a), U.N. Doc. A/RES/61/146 (Dec. 19, 2006).
147. See De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 1012.
148. Id. at 985.
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indicated that only fourteen countries permitted a juvenile LWOP
sentence—and it was not even clear whether “life” necessarily foreclosed
the possibility of parole.149 More recent research suggests that in fact only
ten countries other than the United States permit the penalty.150 Looking at
the actual practice of juvenile LWOP sentences, the 2005 survey identified
only three countries other than the United States where juvenile offenders
are actually serving such sentences: South Africa, Tanzania and Israel.151
Updating this research through communications with officials in every
country where the juvenile LWOP sentence is possible, Professors Connie
de La Vega and Michelle Leighton found that as of 2008, no juvenile
offenders were serving a life without the possibility of parole sentence.152
Even if this exhaustive study failed to identify a country that in fact has
sentenced a juvenile offender to LWOP, it is clear that the overwhelming
number of foreign jurisdictions disfavor the use of the juvenile LWOP
sentence in both law and practice.
B. The United States’ Response to International Prohibition on Juvenile
LWOP Sentences
The United States’ response to the international prohibition on the
juvenile LWOP sentence has been largely uniform: explicit disagreement.
This position is clearly articulated in a series of reservations to the ICCPR.
First, the Senate explicitly defined cruel, inhumane or degrading treatment
in Article 7 of the ICCPR as synonymous with “cruel and unusual
punishment” as captured in the U.S. Constitution.153 Second, while noting
that “the policy and practice of the United States are generally in
compliance with and supportive of the Covenant’s provisions regarding
treatment of juveniles in the criminal justice system,” the Senate reserved
to the United States “the right, in exceptional circumstances, to treat
juveniles as adults, notwithstanding [contrary ICCPR treaty provisions].”154
In carving these reservations out of the ICCPR, the Senate made clear that
the United States remained free to use the juvenile LWOP sentence, albeit
149. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH & AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL, THE REST OF THEIR LIVES: LIFE
WITHOUT PAROLE FOR CHILD OFFENDERS IN THE UNITED STATES 106 (2005) [hereinafter HRW & AI].
150. MICHELLE LEIGHTON & CONNIE DE LA VEGA, SENTENCING OUR CHILDREN TO DIE IN
PRISON: GLOBAL LAW AND PRACTICE 4 (2007); see also De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at
990. The ten countries are Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Belize, Brunei, Cuba, Dominica,
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the Solomon Islands, and Sri Lanka. Cf. HRW & AI, supra note 149,
at 106-07.
151. HRW & AI, supra note 149, at 106.
152. De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 985.
153. 138 CONG. REC. S. 4781 (1992).
154. Id. at 4783.
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in “exceptional circumstances.”155 More recently, the United States twice
opposed United Nations General Assembly resolutions calling in part for
the abolition of the LWOP sentence for juvenile offenders.156
As noted above, a slightly more difficult inquiry is how to assess the
United States’ decision not to ratify the CRC.157 Most basically, the United
States has no treaty obligation requiring it not to use the juvenile LWOP
sentence.158 A number of commentators have argued that the abolition of
the juvenile LWOP sentence has now risen to the level of customary
international law,159 and would thus bind the United States notwithstanding
the fact that it has not ratified the CRC.160 Even if this is the case, it does
not reveal anything about the United States’ decision not to ratify the CRC.
While a number of reasons underlie the political branches’ decision not to
ratify the CRC,161 the most relevant objection to ratification relating to the
juvenile LWOP sentence is based in concerns about federalism.
Examining why the United States chose not to ratify the CRC reveals
a strong concern with preserving states’ control over a body of law
traditionally understood to fall within their ambit.162 Most broadly, “[t]he
CRC touches on many aspects of family law and juvenile justice that have
customarily been regulated by the states and not the federal

155. Id. The Human Rights Committee, which oversees implementation of the ICCPR, recently
suggested that the United States’ practice of juvenile LWOP rendered it non-compliant with article 24
of the ICCPR notwithstanding its reservation. See Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports
Submitted by States Parties under Article 40 of the Covenant: Concluding Observations of the Human
Rights Committee, ¶ 34, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/USA/CO/3/Rev.1 (Dec. 18, 2006). Commentators have
interpreted these observations to mean that “[t]he extraordinary breadth and rapid development in the
United States of sentencing child offenders to LWOP since the United States’ ratification of the ICCPR
contradicts the assertion that the United States has applied this sentence only in exceptional
circumstances.” De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 1010.
156. See supra note 146.
157. See supra Part III.B.
158. See CRC, supra note 137, at art. 37(a).
159. See, e.g., De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 1013-18; Levy, supra note 143, at 276
(“Ultimately, the view that Article 37(a) [of the CRC] is binding upon the United States by virtue of its
crystallization into a norm of customary law is more than just colorable.”).
160. The reach of customary international law and the extent of its applicability in federal court in
the United States are well beyond the scope of this Note. For a recent discussion, see generally Ernest
A. Young, Sorting Out the Debate Over Customary International Law, 42 VA. J. INT’L L. 365 (2002).
For an argument that a country should be able to opt-out of customary international law, see generally
Curtis A. Bradley & Mitu Gulati, Withdrawing from International Custom, 120 YALE L.J. 202 (2010).
161. See Lainie Rutkow & Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children?: A Call for the United States
Ratification of the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161,
173-80 (2006) (describing objections to ratification of the CRC as rooted in concerns about sovereignty,
federalism, reproductive and family planning, and parents’ rights).
162. See Susan Kilbourne, Student Research, The Convention on the Rights of the Child:
Federalism Issues for the United States, 5 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL’Y 327, 327 (1998).
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government.”163 More specifically, an objection to ratification centered on
uninhibited state autonomy to sentence juvenile offenders.164 And while the
Court’s decision in Roper indeed rendered moot the need to protect a
state’s right to permit the death penalty for juvenile offenders, the decision
specifically left unaddressed—and arguably seemed to endorse—the
juvenile LWOP sentence.165 In light of the existing ICCPR reservations166
and the opposition votes to the recent U.N. General Assembly
resolutions,167 the United States’ ongoing refusal to ratify the CRC should
be seen to include a rejection of the strong international consensus against
the juvenile LWOP sentence.
***
Taken together, the two prongs of the proposed analysis of
international materials do not place much of a thumb on the scale in the
Graham case. Although the survey of law and practice in foreign
jurisdictions weighs heavily in favor of a decision that prohibits the
juvenile LWOP sentence, the United States’ persistent expression of
disagreement with this international consensus amounts to a strong
counterweight. The resultant stasis—had this been the Court’s analysis in
this case—would, however, have been far from uninformative. It would
have shed considerable light on the methodological questions underlying
the normative debate about the use of international materials in
constitutional interpretation—at least as applied to the Eighth Amendment
cruel and unusual punishment analysis.
V. A MISSED OPPORTUNITY: INTERNATIONAL MATERIALS IN
GRAHAM V. FLORIDA
When, however, the Court was presented the opportunity to clarify
the role of international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis in the
Graham case, it let the opportunity slip away. In deciding that the juvenile
LWOP sentence for non-homicide offenders is unconstitutional, the Court
devoted a brief section of its opinion in Graham to considering how

163. Rutkow & Lozman, supra note 161, at 177.
164. See Howard Davidson, A Model Child Protection Legal Reform Instrument: The Convention
on the Rights of the Child and its Consistency with United States Law, 5 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. &
POL’Y 185, 187 (1998).
165. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 572 (2005) (“To the extent the juvenile death penalty might
have residual deterrent effects, it is worth noting that the punishment of life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole is itself a severe sanction, in particular for a young person.”).
166. See supra note 153 & 154.
167. See supra note 145 & 146.
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international materials “support [its] conclusion.”168 Not only did this
section fail to explicitly address the methodological question of how to use
international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis, it also used such
materials in the unprincipled manner that has troubled critics.169 This
missed opportunity means that debate about the proper role of international
materials in Eighth Amendment—and by extension domestic
constitutional—analysis will almost certainly continue.
The Court’s analysis proceeded along similar lines to the death
penalty cases reviewed above.170 It began by invoking the language from
Trop of “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a
maturing society,”171 and then determined that the proper analysis for the
“categorical challenge to a term-of-years sentence” presented in Graham
was the two-step review: objective indicia of consensus and the exercise of
independent judgment. 172 Importantly, in determining that imposition of
the juvenile LWOP sentence was “exceedingly rare,”173 the Court clarified
that this first step concentrated on the “objective indicia of national
consensus.”174 Accordingly, the Court only looked at domestic legislation
and domestic sentencing practices.175 In explaining why the “judicial
exercise of independent judgment”176 also led to the conclusion that the
juvenile LWOP sentence is unconstitutional, the Court relied on many of
the same factors it considered in Roper: lessened culpability of juveniles,177
the harsh nature of the punishment as applied to juveniles,178 and the
weakened case for both retribution179 and deterrence as applied to
juveniles.180 After a brief section justifying a categorical prohibition
against—as opposed to a case-by-case determination of the appropriateness
of—the juvenile LWOP sentence,181 the Court turned its attention to
international materials.

168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.

Graham v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 2033 (2010).
See id.; see also supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See supra Part III.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2021 (citations omitted).
Id. at 2022. For a discussion of the two step process, see supra Part III.
Id. at 2026.
Id. at 2023 (emphasis added).
See id. at 2023-26.
Id. at 2026.
Id. at 2026; Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005).
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2027-28; Roper, 543 U.S. at 572.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571.
Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2028-29; Roper, 543 U.S. at 571-72.
See Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2030-34.
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Before discussing how international materials affect the outcome in
Graham, the Court justified its use of such materials by reference to the
line of cases discussed above.182 Noting that “the Court has looked beyond
our Nation’s borders for support for its independent conclusion that a
particular punishment is cruel and unusual,” the majority cited Roper,
Atkins, Thompson, Enmund, Coker, and Trop.183 Indeed, in language that
further suggests that the use of international materials has codified into a
methodological precedent for Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual
punishment analysis,184 the Court described its interest in “the global
consensus against [the juvenile LWOP] sentencing practice” as a
continuation of “that longstanding practice” of looking to international
materials.185
Unfortunately, the Court’s consideration of international materials
fails to elucidate the role such materials properly play. It should first be
noted that the Court limits its use of international materials to that of
confirming its decision.186 As in Roper, the structure of the opinion187 and
the majority’s careful prose suggests that international materials function to
confirm the Court’s conclusion; the Court specifically notes that
international materials do not “control [its] decision,” but rather “support
[its] conclusion.”188 Indeed, the Court specifically cites Roper to support its
claim that “international opinion” against the juvenile LWOP sentence
“provide[s] respected and significant confirmation for our own
conclusions.”189 This confirmatory approach restricts consideration of
international materials to only those instances where the Court has in
essence already made up its mind, raising the basic question of why it
should bother discussing what foreign jurisdictions have to say about the
issue.190

182. See supra Part II.
183. Graham, 130 S. Ct. at 2033.
184. See supra Part I.B.
185. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2033.
186. See supra Part II.C for a discussion of the confirmatory role of international materials.
187. Part III of Graham includes four subsections. Subsection A considers objective indicia of
national consensus; subsection B presents the Court’s exercise of independent judgment; subsection C
justifies the use of a categorical rule; and subsection D considers international materials. See 130 Sup.
Ct. at 2023-34. This structure suggests the consideration of international materials stands apart from the
Court’s standard two-step analysis discussed supra Part III. Cf. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. at 564-78
(considering objective indicia of consensus and independent judgment in Part III and the role of
international materials in Part IV).
188. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2033.
189. Id. at 2034 (alterations omitted) (citing Roper, 543 U.S. at 578).
190. See supra notes 101-103 and accompanying text.
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More troubling, however, is the Court’s failure to use international
materials in a principled manner: while it does consider the juvenile LWOP
sentence in law and practice, it fails to consider the political branches’
response to the international norm. The majority opinion begins by
surveying the number of foreign jurisdictions that still permit the juvenile
LWOP sentence, and accurately identifies that only ten countries in
addition to the United States allow the sentence in their law.191 Moreover, it
looks beyond law on the books to note that in practice, the United States is
the only country that appears to impose the juvenile LWOP sentence.192
The Court then refers to the CRC’s prohibition of the juvenile LWOP
sentence,193 and in the process refers to the United States’ non-ratification
of that treaty.194 In addition to failing to elaborate on the significance of the
United States’ non-ratification of the CRC, however, the Court does not
discuss the United States’ repeated opposition to the development of an
international norm prohibiting the juvenile LWOP sentence. Additionally,
it does not address the reservations to the ICCPR or the recent no-votes in
the U.N. General Assembly resolutions seeking to abolish the juvenile
LWOP sentence.195 Instead, the Court devotes the final two paragraphs of
this brief section to first restating the confirmatory role international
materials play196 and then dismissing as irrelevant197 the debate as to
whether a binding jus cogens norm against the juvenile LWOP sentence
exists.198
A word about the Court’s final sentence in this section is appropriate.
As though to assuage critics who will argue the Court has once again relied
on the opinions of “like-minded foreigners”199 in reaching its decision, the
Court repeats that international materials do not bind or control, but are
useful in showing that “the Court’s rationale has respected reasoning to
support it.”200 If the Court does have “respected reasoning” supporting its

191. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2033 (citing Leighton & De La Vega, supra note 136).
192. Id. at 2034.
193. See Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 137, at art. 37(a).
194. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2034.
195. See supra notes 143, 153 and accompanying text.
196. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2034.
197. Id.
198. The Court might have justified its consideration of international materials in part on the basis
that in the exercise of its independent judgment, it found the prohibition of the juvenile LWOP sentence
to be a jus cogens norm. See supra notes 116 & 122. It did not do so.
199. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 608 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
200. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2034.
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decision, however, it fails to make this clear in its opinion.201 The mere fact
that foreign jurisdictions have abolished the juvenile LWOP sentences says
nothing about why they have chosen to do so.202 The Court offers no
discussion of the reasoning underlying foreign jurisdictions’ decisions to
proscribe the juvenile LWOP sentence. Even assuming reference to the
“persuasive reasoning” of a foreign jurisdiction is an appropriate way to
use international materials,203 the Court has merely shown that foreign
jurisdictions have stopped using the juvenile LWOP sentence, not the
reasoning driving those decisions.
Finally, two references in Justice Thomas’s dissent illustrate how the
Court’s use of international materials in Graham perpetuates the confusion
about the proper role such materials should play in Eighth Amendment
analysis. First, in critiquing the majority’s use of the objective indicia of
national consensus, Justice Thomas counts as one of the metrics the Court
looks to “state and federal legislation, jury behavior, and (surprisingly,
given that we are talking about ‘national’ consensus) international
opinion.”204 Despite the Court’s effort to underscore its use of international
materials as providing “respected reasoning”205 to “support [its]
conclusion,”206 Justice Thomas clearly sees the use of such materials as
skewing the objective indicia inquiry—what some scholars would see as
another example of “denominator swelling.”207 Not only do the majority
and dissent disagree about the use of international materials; they also
disagree about how such materials are being used methodologically in the
opinion itself.
Second, Justice Thomas also evinces concern that the majority
unjustifiably relies on global practice regarding the juvenile LWOP
sentence while ignoring the fact that eleven countries continue to have the
punishment established in their laws.208 This critique, of course, inverts that
201. See Sitaraman, supra note 10, at 676 (“Persuasive reasoning involves a judge considering the
argumentation or logic of a foreign decision and using that argument in his decision.”).
202. See id. at 677 (“In cases of persuasive reasoning, the court must of course pay close attention
to the internal logic of the opinion. But it is also crucial that the court consider the context surrounding
the foreign case. The texts of the provisions interpreted might be different, the foreign country’s core
values might differ, and the politics of the foreign country may have been instrumental in shaping the
outcome of the decision.”).
203. See generally id. at 670-77 (identifying the use of persuasive reasoning from foreign
jurisdictions as a “potentially problematic” way to use international materials).
204. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2045 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
205. Id. at 2034 (majority opinion).
206. Id. at 2033.
207. See Young, supra note 10, at 158-60.
208. Graham, 130 Sup. Ct. at 2053 n.12 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[D]espite the Court’s attempt to
count the actual number of juvenile nonhomicide offenders serving life-without-parole sentences in
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articulated by Justice Scalia in dissent in Roper: foreign countries may have
laws prohibiting a certain practice, but these laws signify little if they do
not actually adhere to such laws in practice.209 As this Note has argued, the
response is that both law and practice matter.210 In failing to explain,
however, that it relies both on the relatively low number of jurisdictions
that retain the juvenile LWOP sentence in law and on the fact that only one
of these jurisdictions—the United States—actually imposes the sentence in
practice,211 the Court leaves the impression—at least for the Graham (and
Roper) dissenters—that it will selectively use the law or practice of foreign
jurisdictions to make its point. A simple statement by the Court that it
draws on both law and practice as part of its consideration of international
materials would both clarify the proper analysis and illustrate that such
analysis proceeds in a predictable and principled manner.
***
The upshot of the Court’s brief discussion of international materials in
Graham—and the dissent’s even briefer response—is that confusion about
the proper role of international materials in Eighth Amendment analysis
persists. This is an unfortunate situation, especially given that Graham
presented the Court with an ideal opportunity to tackle this thorny question
head-on.
CONCLUSION
Whether American courts should consider international materials
when interpreting the U.S. Constitution will likely be debated for years to
come. This Note has largely abstained from staking out a position in this
debate. Instead, starting from the observation that the Supreme Court has in
fact considered international materials as part of its analysis of the Eighth
Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, the Note aims
both to make sense of and refine the Court’s methodological approach to
using such materials.
Indeed, better understanding of how the Court has incorporated
consideration of international materials into the Eighth Amendment
analysis, and how it might use those materials in a principled way, may

other nations . . . the laws of other countries permit juvenile life-without-parole sentences.”) (citations
omitted) (emphasis added).
209. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 623 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“It is interesting that
. . . the Court is quite willing to believe that every foreign nation—of whatever tyrannical political
makeup and with however subservient or incompetent a court system—in fact adheres to a rule of no
death penalty for offenders under 18.”) (emphasis in original).
210. See supra Part III.A.
211. De La Vega & Leighton, supra note 136, at 985.
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elucidate the normative arguments about the propriety of using such
materials in the first place. This Note’s normative claim is relatively
modest: if an American court is to use international materials when
determining whether a punishment is cruel and unusual under the Eighth
Amendment, it should use such materials in a principled manner, or not use
them at all. At a minimum, principled use involves considering not only the
law on the books in foreign jurisdictions but also state practice. Likewise,
to use international materials in a principled way under the Eighth
Amendment, a court should confront head-on the United States’ response
to the international norm at issue, and explain what conclusions it draws
from that response. Although the Graham case provided a vehicle through
which such methodological clarification was possible, none was
forthcoming. While the Graham decision does indicate that the use of
international materials in Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment
is appropriate, it offers meager guidance on how such materials should be
used.
Agreement on the propriety of using international materials to
interpret the American Constitution seems unlikely. But surely it is
uncontroversial to acknowledge that if courts are to use such materials in
Eighth Amendment analysis, they should do so well. This Note suggests a
methodological framework for such an analysis.

